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BOOK REVIEWS
IKE AND ADLAI REVISITED-MIRROR IMAGES REVERSED? ADLAI
STEVENSON: His LIFE AND LEGACY. By Porter McKeever. New York:
William Morrow & Co. 1989. Pp. 591. $24.95. Morrow Quill, 1990. Paper.
$14.95.
Reviewed by Jeffrey O'Connell,* Charles Elson,** and Thomas E.
O'Connell***
Porter McKeever's highly acclaimed biography of Adlai Stevenson may be
of particular interest to lawyers because, among other things, it describes the
Democratic presidential candidate's quondam career in the law. It will, of
course, be of even greater interest to Illinois lawyers because Stevenson, born
and raised in Bloomington, graduated from Northwestern University School of
Law and practiced law in Chicago on and off during his entire professional
life.
"Adlai," as McKeever refers to his close friend and United Nations associ-
ate, was always like a moth around a light bulb about the practice of law. He
started off badly in 1924 when he flunked out of Harvard Law School in his
second year.1 He had not liked Harvard.' It was only under his father's urging
and the stimulation of the legendary Northwestern law dean, John Henry
Wigmore, that Adlai returned to his law studies at Northwestern and gradu-
ated with dramatically improved grades in 1926.3
Adlai's liking for the practice of law and his performance as a lawyer were
also variable. McKeever says, "he never really liked the law."' As Stevenson
began his career after Northwestern, he seemed to feel that there was a direct
conflict between "doing good" and doing legal work. After accepting a law
clerk's post in the prestigious law firm of Cutting, Moore and Sidley, he wrote
to a friend:
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1. P. MCKEEVER, ADLAI STEVENSON: His LIFE AND LEGACY 46 (1989).
2. Id. at 45.
3. Id. at 50.
4. Id. at 45.
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I must confess, heretical and un-American as it may seem, that I view the
prospect without the least eagerness. . . . I know perfectly well that if I am
to make a "success," sooner or later I must "sell out"-I mean chuck most
of my ideas and my acute sympathy for the less fortunate. A stony and
obedient loyalty to class and vested interests seems to be the necessary ad-
junct of a lifetime of hard and imaginationless work.6
Yet, on one of his many forays back into the law from stints of public service,
he wrote to a friend in 1956, "It is wonderful to be a lawyer again!"6 As for
the quality of his work, his prot6g6 and partner, Newton Minow, once said,
"the grubby details bored him, but he was a good negotiator." 7
Unquestionably, it was public service or government work that proved to be
his real love. Stevenson's early work with Cutting, Moore and Sidley conflicted
almost from the start with his participation in the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations. 8 Elected president of the Council in 1933, Adlai devoted more and
more time to its activities.9 While it impinged on his work as a lawyer, his
presidency of the council served as a springboard into public life.' 0 For Steven-
son, the law was always a fallback from public service roles: various early
assignments in Washington, D.C., including the World War II job that he
called "legal maid servant to [Navy Secretary] Frank Knox";" his term as
Governor of Illinois; his two runs for the United States presidency in 1952 and
1956; and his final work at the United Nations. Overall, he was a successful
and sought-after lawyer and he worked hard at the law, but law always took
second place in his heart.
Stevenson's stature has fallen off since he was the darling of nearly all liber-
als and most Democrats in the 1950s. How might Porter McKeever's biogra-
phy affect that change of view? McKeever has written a generally favorable
assessment of his old colleague but certainly not a hagiography. Rather, we
have a balanced, careful, scrupulously researched and well written book.
A reader senses, though, that McKeever's heart is in conflict with his head.
He loved Adlai as many of us loved him in the 1950s; we saw Adlai as an
extraordinarily graceful, articulate, thoughtful candidate in 1952 and
1956-especially in 1952. But while many of us who loved him in the 1950s
without knowing him personally have had second thoughts, it is incomparably
more difficult for McKeever, who knew Adlai well. We sense McKeever trying
manfully to show us Adlai, blemishes and all-but his love keeps showing
through. One of the charms of this readable biography is watching an engag-
ing and thoroughly professional, experienced writer struggle with how he feels
about his old friend and what he must nevertheless tell us honestly about him.
5. Id. at 54.
6. Id. at 395.
7. Id. at 342.
8. Id. at 65.
9. Id. at 64.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 75.
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So we learn about Adlai's tendency toward self-pity, 2 his foppish and some-
what snobbish Princetonian attitudes and associations,"3 his tendency, particu-
larly but not exclusively late in his life, to surround himself with sycophantic,
often vastly wealthy, women," and his overindulgence, particularly during his
United Nations years, in food and drink. 15
In light of what we now know from McKeever and others, would Adlai have
made a good President? A corollary question arises: in light of the parallel
reassessment that Dwight Eisenhower is currently and perhaps even more dra-
matically undergoing, would Adlai have made a better President than Ike?
This question becomes particularly intriguing when one notes that the emerg-
ing views of the two men, particularly as they are being perceived increasingly
by liberals such as McKeever, are dramatically opposite to views widely held
in the 1950s. Originally considered a great intellectual and the liberal voice of
conscience on the American scene, Stevenson has lost much of his aura with
the publication of several recent works, including McKeever's. The once
gleaming, silver reputation has become more than a bit tarnished. This decline
is all the more stark in contrast to newfound respect for Eisenhower.
Before proceeding to further examination of a flawed Adlai and an exami-
nation of the "new" revisionist Ike, it may be helpful to review in more detail
how liberals in the 1950s viewed the two men.
In the minds of liberal intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s, Adlai was like a
knight in shining armor. Historian Herbert Muller, in his 1967 book, Adlai
Stevenson: A Study in Values, called him
a thoroughly civilized man, sensitive, reasonable, gracious, humorous, ur-
bane and a man of true style . . . an especially rare sort in politics as a civil
idealist who was most earnest and high-minded, raising both the intellectual
level and the moral tone. of our political debate, yet who remained genial,
humbler, and more magnanimous than most idealists, never pompous or
self-righteous.' 6
Stevenson represented "conscience in politics" and "provide[d] a leadership
the victor, [Eisenhower]," could not. 7 Stevenson was considered a progressive,
erudite, brilliant intellectual and almost immediately, upon stepping into the
national political arena during the 1952 election, he captured the hearts and
passion of the liberal intelligentsia. James Reston, writing in the New York
Times in July of 1952, called Stevenson "a man of reason . . . distinguished
for the intellectual content of what he says . . . a Wilsonian figure, highly
literate, idealistic and urbane."'" Arthur Krock, also in a Times column, sug-
12. Id. at 402.
13. Id. at 54-55.
14. Id. at 555.
15. See, e.g.. id. at 515 (Adlai "was ... very overweight. [He] had long been a compulsive
eater.").
16. H. MULLER, ADLAI STEVENSON: A STUDY IN VALUES Xi (1967).
17. S. BROWN, CONSCIENCE IN POLITICS: ADLAI E. STEVENSON IN THE 1950s viii (1961).
18. Reston, The Two Candidates: A Study in Contrasts, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1952, § 4, at 3,
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gested, rather grumpily, that much of Stevenson's support and Eisenhower's
opposition came from "the 'true liberals,' particularly those in the faculty
houses."' 9
Throughout the 1952 campaign, the New Republic was an enthusiastic sup-
porter of Stevenson's candidacy. In mid-October, under a banner headline pro-
claiming "Stevenson Speaks," the magazine reported that "very rarely in
American politics the best among us is nominated for the Presidency ....
Adlai Stevenson is such a man." 20 Why was Stevenson "the best"? He was
"whimsical, intellectual [and] high-minded,"'" a man of "dry wit, courage and
audacity," 2 and, of course, a liberal. He was "a remarkable figure-possibly
one of the really great politicians of this century."2 3 What apparently im-
pressed the New Republic editors most about Stevenson was his seeming bril-
liance, which they felt was responsible for spectacular public speeches. The
editors likened his "literate" addresses, especially when compared with those
of his less gifted opponent, to the works of Emerson. 24 Much space was de-
voted to the reprinting of some of the Governor's choicest lines. In fact, a
Stevenson speech pamphlet was printed up and heavily advertised in every
weekly issue of the New Republic throughout the campaign. The speeches
were to be "treasured as classics in the finest tradition of the United States."2
Indeed, Stevenson possessed "the ability to take a tough problem and make
the common man understand what he is saying without condescending ....
[H]e seasons his talk and wit and humor, expresses his ideas in razor-sharp
phrases, and at heart is a compassionate and humble man."28
Stevenson's tremendous popularity among many liberal intellectuals flour-
ished throughout the 1950s and early 1960s and continued for a time after his
death in 1965. Much of the praise he received centered on his intellect. He
was honored as "a highly literate man at home in the world of ideas, at ease in
the company of intellectuals. 2 7 His speeches were looked upon as literary and
philosophical masterpieces and were collected and published in book form by
Random House, with the noted novelist John Steinbeck writing the foreword.2 8
Adlai was a happy, "civilized" man, "who brought humor into American polit-
ical life, a rare combination of gaiety, wit, and grace. ' 29 "Both philosophical
and earthy, his humor made it possible for him to be as earnest as he pleased
col. 2.
19. Krock, In the Nation, It All Depends on Which is the Gander, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1952,
at 30, col. 5.
20. Stevenson Speaks, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 1952, at 9.
21. Washington Wire, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1952, at 3.
22. Washington Wire, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 8, 1952, at 3.
23. Washington Wire, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 1952, at 3.
24. Washington Wire, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1952, at 3.
25. Stevenson Speaks, supra note 20, at 9.
26. Washington Wire, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 8, 1952, at 4.
27. H. MULLER, supra note 16, at 3.
28. See Steinbeck, Foreword to A. STEVENSON, SPEECHES OF ADLAI STEVENSON (1952).
29. H. MULLER, supra note 16, at 327.
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without being pompous, as high-minded without being self-righteous."80 The
Governor was honored as a true liberal both in politics and personal philoso-
phy. His lack of prejudice was the result of his boyhood; he was "spared the
prejudice and intolerance that flourished on the common Fundamentalism of
rural America." '81 Indeed, the nation's "best hope" lay in Stevenson's "wis-
dom"-"a clear intelligence, informed by a sufficient awareness of complexity
and difficulty, sobered by a tragic sense, but sweetened by a spirit of faith,
hope, and charity." ' 2
In contrast, liberal intellectuals of the 1950s saw Eisenhower as an unlet-
tered boob. In a 1958 book entitled Eisenhower: Captive Hero," Marquis
Childs seemed to sum up liberal frustration with the President. Ike was "sim-
ple-minded" 8 ' and indecisive. According to Childs, Eisenhower was no intel-
lectual. "In high school he had been good in mathematics and history, and he
was to continue to interest himself sporadically in military history. But this
was the beginning and the end of his intellectual interests. Today for pleasure
he-reads only Westerns." 35 Indeed, "at night, he ignored the memorandums he
was given and spent time on his favorite Westerns."8 "
To emphasize his point, Childs reprinted a political cartoon that appeared in
1956 in the Denver Post. 7 The cartoon depicted a genial, smiling Ike reading
a newspaper full of holes, with a wise old elephant in another room removing
articles entitled "Middle East Crisis," "Missile Program," and "Economic Aid
Program" from another paper destined for the President's attention, saying,
"We Don't Like to Worry Him." 8
Childs supported his characterization of Eisenhower as indecisive by stating:
"[H]is temperament, it is fairly clear, is a passive one. The outward geniality
• . .conceal[s] . ..caution that has made it excessively difficult for him to
make decisions. He is moved by forces; he does not undertake to move them
himself." 9 "Eisenhower," said Childs, "must be put down as a weak presi-
dent.' 40 Indeed, "he brought to the office so little prepiration for what is
surely the most difficult and demanding position in the world.""'
Finally, Childs criticized Eisenhower for a lack of both political savvy and
energy in office. The President seemed detached from the responsibilities of his
position. He delegated much of his authority and was "unwilling or unable to
30. Id.
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id. at 326.
33. M. CHILDS, EISENHOWER: CAPTIVE HERO (1958).
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id. at 33.
36. Id. at 132.
37. Id. at 199.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 47.
40. Id. at 292.
41. Id.
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exercise many of [his] powers."' As his term progressed, Childs suggested
that Ike's "commitment to politics, to the office, to the responsibilities of lead-
ership was visibly slackening."'" This "lack of knowledge and . . . abhorrence
of all things political"'4  was a fatal flaw in both the man and his
administration.
Not that liberals had always taken such a dim view of Eisenhower. In 1948,
the Americans for Democratic Action ("ADA"), a liberal political organiza-
tion, 5 had begun a campaign to dump then President, Harry Truman, and
make Ike the Democratic nominee.4" The General "seemed capable of spectac-
ular accomplishments at home and abroad . . . . According to ADA, Eisen-
hower would 'stir the popular enthusiasm which will sweep progressive candi-
dates across the country into Congress' and produce the type of leadership
that would 'defeat both the forces of vested reaction and the Communist-dom-
inated third party.' "'4
By the 1952 campaign, however, with Eisenhower's nomination for Presi-
dent by the Republican Party, liberals had adopted a radically different stance
toward Ike. Throughout the campaign, the liberal New Republic was particu-
larly biting in its attacks on Eisenhower. Although calling Ike "earnest [and]
sincere, the editors found little else to recommend him. Calling him an "or-
dinary man,"' 9 they found him a candidate lacking in great intellectual quali-
ties. Their constant attacks on his speeches are particularly illustrative:
There is amusing frustration in Ike's press cars. Reporters gag at the syn-
thetic banalities of the rear-platform talks, and the sanctimonious unction of
the major speeches, (which are written and sent in from New York for Ike
to deliver). The contrast with Stevenson's literate speeches makes this elec-
tion seem like a race between one of Emerson's essays and an advertisement
for bubble-gum.50 To help him in speech-writing . . . Ike picked Stanley
High of Readers' Digest. Somehow that tells the story . . . . Now the esti-
mable . . . Mr. High is doing his best to give us a Readers' Digest
President."
Particular note was made of the fact that Eisenhower did not write his own
speeches but employed a legion of "ghost-writers." 2
The New Republic also called Ike grossly uninformed. In early October, an
article remarked that "Ike's capacity for amazement at the discovery of the
42. Id. at 290.
43. id. at 282.
44. Id. at 70.
45. See Kirkendall, Election of 1948, in 4 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
3103 (A. Schlesinger, Jr. & F. Israel eds. 1971).
46. Id. at 3103-04.
47. Id. at 3104.
48. Washington Wire, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 1952, at 3.
49. Stevenson Speaks, supra note 20, at 9.
50. Washington Wire, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1952, at 3.
51. Washington Wire, THE NEw REPUBLIC Sept. 8, 1952, at 3.
52. Brant, The Tragedy of Eisenhower, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1952, at 6.
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everyday facts of economic life is astonishing."5 A week earlier, in a report on
an Eisenhower speech on defense policy, it was suggested that "the General is
ignorant of what has been taking place in the Defense Department under
[Secretaries] Marshall and Lovett.""'
Throughout the campaign, it was hinted that Eisenhower was a sort of pup-
pet under the control of the right wing of the Republican Party. His "embrac-
ing" of Senator McCarthy was strongly attacked,"5 and it was claimed that
the candidate was "surrounded by advisors" representing "reactionary ele-
ments."'5 6 If elected, "Ike would act as a regent and [Ohio's conservative Sena-
tor Robert A.] Taft would hold the reins."'5 7 Indeed, the New Republic re-
peated the oft-cited comparison between Eisenhower and another hapless
general-turned-politician, Ulysses S. Grant. 8
Throughout his term as President and for many years thereafter, the liberal
intelligentsia remained markedly unimpressed with Dwight Eisenhower. They
considered him an unlearned dullard, "an indecisive leader overwhelmed-or
bored-by duties that called for intellect and firmness." 59 His news confer-
ences were particularly ridiculed. His answers to the reporters' queries were
often considered uninformed, vague, and inarticulately presented. ° Indeed, he
was called "a 'captive hero' in the clutches of his 'palace guard' of unelected
assistants and millionaire cabinet advisors."61 Ike, was a "limited" man,"2 suf-
fering from "naivete." 63
As times change, however, so do interpretations of past figures and events.
Both Ike and Adlai are now seen quite differently.
First, as to the tarnishing of Stevenson's image, much was written about
Stevenson immediately following his death in 1965, most of it very favorable.
The less adulatory reassessment really began when John Bartlow Martin, a
longtime Stevenson aide, published his comprehensive biography of Stevenson
in two volumes in 197664 and 1977.65 While the portrait Martin painted was
on the whole favorable, the paragon of the 1950s was often hard to find. For
example, Martin revealed that the Governor was scarcely as well-read as ear-
lier supposed. He described Stevenson's study at his Libertyville farm home as
being filled with numerous books,
53. Washington Wire, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1952, at 3.
54. Phillips, Ike As A Military Man, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1952, at 7.
55. Washington Wire, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1952, at 3.
56. Brant, supra note 52, at 6.
57. Washington Wire, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1952, at 3.
58. Washington Wire, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1952, at 4; Fuchs, Letters, Khaki Candi-
dates, THE NEW REPUBLIC. Oct. 13, 1952, at 2.
59. E. RICHARDSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 27 (1979).
60. Id. at 28-29.
61. Id. at 29.
62. S. BROWN, CONSCIENCE IN POLITICS: ADLAI E. STEVENSON IN THE 1950s, at 5 (1961).
63. H. MULLER, supra note 16, at 107.
64. J. MARTIN, ADLAI STEVENSON OF ILLINOIS (1976).
65. J. MARTIN. ADLAI STEVENSON AND THE WORLD (1977).
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encrusted not only with his own speeches and books by and about him, but
also . . a disorderly collection of books, mostly on current foreign affairs,
sent to him by publishers or authors, written by such people as James
Byrnes, Barbara Ward, Thomas K. Finletter, Chester Bowles, Theodore H.
White, James P. Warburg, and Walter Lippmann.66
Despite his collection, however, "Stevenson was not a great reader, and few of
the books . . . show much evidence of having been read. ' ' 67 Indeed, Stevenson,
Martin suggested, was never really an intellectual at all, contrary to widely
accepted opinion. Close aide Newton Minow once said:
I never thought of him as an intellectual. He was not a great reader. Not a
great student. He complained that he never had time to read a book but the
fact is that he did not want to read a book [although] ...he knew it was
important to read books.68
Stevenson was an
aural person . . . .A lonely man after his divorce, he did not occupy his
free time by reading but, rather, by seeing people. He always had people
around him, was never alone if he could help it (despite his repeated protes-
tations that what he wanted was quiet time, time to be alone, time to read,
time to think). He was remarkably lacking the internal resources that en-
able men to live alone and think and read. Despite his powerful appeal to
intellectuals, he was not really himself an intellectual.69
If that was the case, with what sources were those magnificent speeches writ-
ten, speeches considered to be such eloquent literary masterpieces by such lib-
eral intellectual publications as the New Republic? "[Aln encyclopedia, a Bi-
ble, an anthology of quotations, plus three shelves of books on Lincoln,"
reported Martin.7" Not a very broad range of intellectual sources.
George Ball, another close Stevenson associate, in his 1982 autobiography,7
also described Stevenson as scarcely the intellectual he had previously been
presumed to be. Writing about preparations for the 1956 presidential cam-
paign, Ball mentioned that the Governor attended
few meetings and when he did attend gave little evidence of having read the
position papers. That reinforced my long-held suspicion that he had little
taste for the arduous laboratory work of dissecting tough issues, cutting
through the gristle to the bone, and paring away the obfuscating tissue. He
preferred to talk generally about problems and was bored by their technical
complexities.72
66. J. MARTIN. supra note 64, at 129.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 473.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 128-29.
71. G. BALL, THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN (1982).
72. Id. at 132-33.
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Ball also called Stevenson indecisive, a quality even his admirers in the 1950s
faulted him for, and criticized him for "overdramatiz[ing] his own predica-
ment-portraying himself as a hero beset by temptations, while at the same
time indulging in a self-disparagement that was tinged with artifice. '7' Martin
had also referred to Stevenson's long recognized characteristic of indecisive-
ness, claiming:
[Stevenson] seemed to lack direction. Though he had a great capacity for
leading, in the behind-the-scenes labor of running a government or a cam-
paign it was always hard to get him to focus on a problem until he really
must; and sometimes then it was too late . . . . [Bletween crises he drifted,
fretted more about future planning than he planned, left it to his staff. And
this pattern persisted throughout his presidential campaigns and his UN
ambassadorship."'
Although Adlai Stevenson was considered the hardworking champion of
many liberal causes, privately he appears not quite so democratic. Martin
presents Stevenson, particularly in his younger days, as something of a snob.
At Choate, Princeton, and Harvard Law School, he tended to associate only
with the tonier sets." He appeared to be constantly immersed in "society" at
one elite gathering or another .7 Indeed, the young Stevenson comes through
in Martin's volumes as a club man through and through, a "gentleman" of the
type most commonly found in F. Scott Fitzgerald novels. In this vein, he was
sometimes seen to display a "hint of prejudice" common to those in that
grouping.7 One day, according to Martin, in describing his father's visit to
Harvard, Stevenson remarked that his elder was "'very impressed with the
display of erudition not to mention the thirsty intellects of the semitic ele-
ment.' ,,71 This remark about Jews, according to Martin, was "not an isolated
instance. It flawed Stevenson's attitudes for years."17 9 Admittedly, Martin ex-
plains this prejudice away as common to those of Stevenson's socially promi-
nent background.80 Stevenson appears, however, to have remained throughout
his private life a snobbish aristocrat whose idea of the perfect weekend was to
sit about in leisurely "pleasure with attractive wealthy people in elegant coun-
try surroundings."'"
Indeed, in the words of George Ball, "'Adlai was never a real liberal.' "
As Martin puts it:
In domestic affairs [as governor, Stevenson] ...had pursued conservative
73. Id. at 120.
74. J. MARTIN, supra note 64, at 457.
75. Id. at 69.
76. Id.




81. ld. at 72.
82. Id. at 169.
1991]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
fiscal policies and had not liked the drift of power to Washington. His in-
stincts were conservative. [Arthur] Schlesinger [Jr.] considered Stevenson
illiberal on civil rights and economics . . . . When Stevenson became a na-
tional figure in the Democratic Party, which was dominated by liberals at
the time, he had to abandon conservative ideas he had picked up in Bloom-
ington and Lake Forest. He abandoned them reluctantly. More than once
during the 1952 campaign Schlesinger protested to Stevenson strongly about
[his Vice Presidential candidate and Alabaman] John Sparkman's remarks
on civil rights. Stevenson seemed unmoved. More than once Schlesinger and
others tried to push him into a strongly pro-labor position. But Stevenson
seemed convinced that Truman was in trouble because he was regarded as
the captive of labor. . . . He finally refused to say that he favored repeal of
the Taft-Hartley Act. Carl McGowan [another key Stevenson aide and later
a federal judge] once said that after the [1952 Democratic] convention sev-
eral liberal members of the Truman administration came out to Springfield
from Washington to discuss their views with the man who might become
their leader. Some of them went back to Washington dazed and shocked by
what they regarded as Stevenson's conservatism.88
Although regarded by many in his heyday as most elegant and urbane, by
the end of his life, according to George Ball, Adlai Stevenson "'sort of went to
seed.' "' He became a glutton-too much to eat, out at parties too often and
too late, surrounded by too many sycophants. He was " 'overweight, '  and
"'sneaked food like an alcoholic.' "86 He became rather pitiful. Ball noted
with particular poignancy Stevenson's last years:
'This business of living in New York with all these middle-aged women-all
of them very rich-some of them public figures-he loved the fact that he
couldn't walk through the streets of New York without being recognized.
He loved the fact that he got great adulation from very rich women. That
was his destruction. I had a funny sense about Adlai. It was symbolic.
He-well, you don't get lean and healthy from adulation-you get over-
weight and despairing. There was a certain self-destruction in Adlai's early
death. I used to tease him about it'a little-tell him he was letting himself
go because he really didn't have it any longer. And he knew it was a very
phony life-the UN--divorced from the reality of politics-living in the un-
critical adulation of these women all the time-adulation largely on the part
of people that didn't count-and not being where the real decisions were
being made. It was a study in futility. Yet he couldn't break free of it.'87
To the public and to his intellectual admirers, Stevenson was an ebullient,
witty intellect, but to Martin and Ball he seemed a lonely and unhappy man.
He had grown up in a turbulent and very unpleasant family setting.88 His
83. Id. at 642-43.
84. J. MARTIN. supra note 65, at 595.
85. Id. at 856.
86. Id. at 596.
87. Id.
88. J. MARTIN, supra note 64, at 34.
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mother and father did not get along; in Martin's words, they "'fought all the
time' "" and lived apart a great deal of the time,"0 foretelling Stevenson's own
unhappy marriage and divorce. 91 Although his parents were socially prominent
people, the home in which Stevenson was raised seems to have been no happy
place. 92 Their "miserable married life"93 quite clearly had an effect on young
Adlai. 9" Of perhaps even greater impact was a 1912 accident in the Stevenson
home in which the twelve-year-old Adlai, while playing with a rifle, accidently
shot and killed a young girl.15 The episode was obviously most traumatic and
painful to Stevenson, and the memory of it, -suggests Martin, continued to
haunt him for the rest of his life.96 Could his lifelong "self-doubts and protes-
tations of unworthiness"' perhaps have resulted from this occurrence?" Mc-
Keever asks the same and related questions, and then terminates his discussion
of the incident this way: "A definitive clue to the mysteries embedded in these
questions can be found in a letter he wrote in 1955 to a woman he did not
know, whose son had been involved in a similar accident. 'Tell him,' Adlai
wrote, 'that he must live for two.' "9
Now, a dozen years after Martin's full biography of Stevenson; and half a
dozen years after George Ball's autobiography, we have the summing up by
Porter McKeever. How does he see his subject from the vantage point of the
quarter century since Stevenson's death and in light of the revisionist tenden-
*cies of other former colleagues of Adlai? Can McKeever defend Stevenson
against the less than adulatory assessments by Martin and Ball? Essentially,
the answer is no. True, on one point McKeever is at pains to exonerate Adlai.
He spends many pages explaining why Adlai was perceived as being indeci-
sive. From Adlai's first uncertainties about running for governor of Illinois in
194810 to his last waverings about how long to stay on at the United Na-
tions,101 McKeever attempts, only in part successfully, to explain why Adlai
was not in fact indecisive and why he appeared to others to be so.' 0 2 In the
case of that first governor's race, he says, "Those involved at the time argued
that his apparent indecisiveness was more the product of his wanting to involve
as many as possible of those close to him in the decision and to make sure he
was giving it balanced consideration . . .,.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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McKeever is less impressed, however, with Adlai's perceived indecisiveness
at the United Nations in 1961.10" Adlai had tried to make it appear that he
was interested in running for the Senate in order to strengthen his position at
the United Nations within the Kennedy administration.1 5 He succeeded, how-
ever, "the President recognized but was not amused by the purpose behind
Adlai's ploy."' 06 Indeed, Kennedy was one of those who perceived Stevenson
as indecisive:
Adlai enjoyed playing intellectual games with a problem. At best this was
irritating to Kennedy, who was direct, practical, operational and preferred
crisp, concise statements. It caused him to feel that Adlai could not make up
his mind . . . .Adlai's [humor] was more discursive, and its self-derogatory
quality contributed to Kennedy's perception that he was uncertain and
indecisive. 101
With respect to most of the other faults cited by Martin and Ball, McKee-
ver is also unable, in all honesty, to exonerate Stevenson. Adlai was, it ap-
pears, socially something of a snob in spite of his lofty, liberal speeches.' 08 He
was a somewhat self-indulgent man who preferred an endless social schedule
of rich meals with wealthy women to reading books.10 9 He did indeed dislike
the nitty-gritty of detail that makes up so much of the world of work, whether
it be in the law or public service." 0
In stark contrast to Adlai Stevenson's early life, Dwight Eisenhower's boy-
hood was untouched by the tony upper-class privilege and the painful turbu-
lence that characterized Stevenson's childhood. Stephen Ambrose, in his biog-
raphy of Eisenhower, speaks of Ike's upbringing:
It is easy, and tempting, to romanticize Eisenhower's family background.
Living in the Norman Rockwell setting of turn-of-the-century Abilene,
David and Ida Eisenhower instilled in their sons the time-honored virtues.
They could serve as a definition of what most Americans think good parents
should be. And the success of each of their six sons in their six different
careers seems to provide proof that they were as ideal as they appear at first
glance."'
Eisenhower grew up in a happy, loving, unpretentious-even financially
strapped-small town home." 2 Especially happy and loving was his mother, as
opposed to his much more "aloof," stern, and authoritative father. 18 This
background may help explain his pleasant, open, and self-confident adult per-
104. Id. at 504.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 504-05.
107. Id. at 491.
108. Id. at 46.
109. Id. at 505, 555.
110. Id. at 342.
11 I. S. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER 22 (1983).
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sonality. Even as a child Ike demonstrated the leadership and organizational
skills so important in adult life.
It was in sports that he first discovered his talents as a leader and an orga-
nizer. As a boy, he provided the energy and leadership that led to a Satur-
day afternoon game of football or baseball. Later, he was one of the or-
ganizers of the Abilene High School Athletic Association, which operated
independently of the school system .... Dwight also organized camping
and hunting trips. He got the boys together, collected the money, hired the
livery rig to take them to Lyons Creek, twenty miles south of Abilene,
bought the food, and did the cooking. 14
As a student at West Point, after his own brilliant career as a halfback was
aborted by an injury, he helped coach the football team.11 5 Ambrose suggests:
[t]he act of coaching brought out his best traits-his organizational ability,
his energy and competitiveness, his enthusiasm and optimism, his willingness
to work hard at a task that intrigued him, his powers of concentration, his
talent for working with the material he had instead of hoping for what he
did not have, and his gift for drawing the best out of his players.116
Later in life, Eisenhower himself spoke of his coaching days, both at West
Point and at many Army posts in his early career: "I believe that football,
perhaps more than any other sport, tends to instill in men the feeling that
victory comes through hard-almost slavish-work, team play, self-confidence,
and an enthusiasm that amounts to dedication." ' These traits that Eisen-
hower demonstrated at a young age would be an integral part of his personal-
ity as an adult and were evident throughout his career.
This brings us to Eisenhower's changing image. The former and longtime
Senator, J. William Fulbright, a noted liberal Democrat and once the "domi-
nant intellectual force in Congress,"" 8 was asked in 1983 for which United
States President he had the most respect. Interestingly enough, in his reply
Fulbright did not mention such Democratic luminaries as John Kennedy or
Harry Truman, but instead cited Eisenhower."" He told the New York Times:
My respect for Eisenhower grows almost daily. There wasn't this machismo
factor like Kennedy and Johnson and Reagan. He refused, over great pres-
sures from Dulles and Nixon and others, to go to Dienbienphu in Vietnam.
He did not get us entangled in these foreign ventures. The country was eco-
nomically strong. He understood foreign policy. 2
114. Id. at 35.
115. Id. at 51.
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120.. Id. But see Lukacs, Ike, Winston and the Russians, (Book Review) N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,
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This reply was dramatically different from what a liberal Democrat's response
would have been only a few years earlier, but it was symptomatic of the posi-
tive reappraisal of Dwight Eisenhower underway in both intellectual and polit-
ical communities.
Dwight Eisenhower, the man who The New Yorker's liberal Washington
correspondent, Richard Rovere, characterized in 1956 as possessing a mind
that was "unschematic" and "distrustful of fine distinctions,"'' has recently
been looked upon as an individual of "keen intelligence." 2  Once viewed as
simple, amiable, and politically inept,"' Ike emerges in recent assessments as
a tough, hardened, savvy politician who successfully concealed from public
view his partisanship and fiery temper toward friend and foe. The image of the
golf-playing, benign, inactive "head of state" has been replaced with that of a
hardworking "politically informed" leader of party and country.'24 No longer
a conservative "captive hero, '" 2" Ike has lately even been seen as a praisewor-
thy leader in the fight for liberal values, adroitly blocking right-wing quests for
dominance.
As long ago as 1967, former New York Post editor and columnist Murray
Kempton, a liberal working for a very liberal paper, 2 anticipated the switch
in opinion on Eisenhower. He wrote an article in Esquire magazine entitled,
"The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower."'' 27 In this piece, Kempton
described Ike as a man of "marvelous intelligence,"' 2 8 calling Eisenhower:
the President most superbly equipped for truly consequential decision we
may ever have had, a mind neither rash nor hesitant, free of the slightest
concern for how things might look, indifferent to any sentiment, as calm
when he was demonstrating the wisdom of leaving a bad situation alone as
when he was moving to meet it on those occasions when he absolutely had to
... .[H]e was the great tortoise upon whose back the world sat for eight
years. We laughed at him; we talked wistfully about moving; and all the
while we never knew the cunning beneath the shell."'
No longer considered an amiable "boob," Eisenhower slowly acquired a repu-
tation for a steely tough intellect, a mind capable of precise, rational, detached
analysis.
In his 1979 biography of Eisenhower, historian Elmo Richardson dealt at
Churchill's attempts at imaginative rapprochement with Russia early in his presidency).
121. F. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN-HAND PRESIDENCY: EISENHOWER AS LEADER 6 (1982)
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124. Id.
125. See M. CHILDS, supra note 33.
126. A. LARSON, supra note 122, at 199.
127. Id. (referring to Kempton, The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower, ESQUIRE, Sept.
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length with Eisenhower's intellectual prowess. 10  He stated that the
"[P]resident's private papers reveal a predilection for precision and logic."1 1
Although the President's official statements were produced by underlings, he
played a significant role in their writing, issuing "lengthy and specific instruc-
tions to them, mercilessly edit[ing] their drafts, and just as savagely edit[ing]
his own revisions up until the moment a statement was issued."' 32 Ike was not,
as suggested by intellectuals in the 1952 campaign, a simpleton, merely par-
roting what others had written. Richardson specifically attacked the "captive
hero" criticism directed at Eisenhower. He recounted the President's method
of dealing with subordinates as an indication of his sharp intellect:
At work in the Oval Office, the president proceeded steadily-occasionally
with what he described as "ordered haste"-but never impulsively. As he
listened to briefings by an assistant, he gave the impression by frowning or
doodling that his thoughts were wandering; then he precisely recapitulated
the main points and fired questions that would put his staff member on the
spot. . . .Such behavior seemed contentious, but he was actually encourag-
ing his subordinate to consider the alternatives and consequences involved in
the problem . . . .At the close of some discussions he would gently make
suggestions that were, of course, instructions .... 31
Finally, Richardson criticized suggestions that Eisenhower was unread. He
noted that the President "preferred to read books by men who had carried out
responsible tasks or who wrote about such men."13 4 Ike particularly enjoyed
the works of philosopher Eric Hoffer, "whose The True Believer expressed the
president's own attitude on individuality endangered by a mass society." 35 It
was only because Eisenhower did not discuss his reading habits publicly that
he gained the reputation that he was no intellect, Richardson suggested. " 6
The liberal political commentator Theodore White has also written of
Dwight Eisenhower's sharp intellect.'3 In his autobiographical work, In
Search of History, White remarked that like many in earlier days, he too
"had made the mistake . . . of considering Ike a simple man, a good straight-
forward soldier.'1 3 8 In actuality,
Ike's mind was not flaccid; and gradually, reporting him as he performed, I
found that his mind was tough, his manner deceptive; that the rosy public
smile could give way, in private, to furious outbursts of temper; that the
tangled, rambling rhetoric of his off-the-cuff remarks could, when he
130. See E. RICHARDSON, supra note 59.
131. Id. at 28.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 29-30.
134. Id. at 28.
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137. T. WHITE, IN SEARCH OF HISTORY: A PERSONAL ADVENTURE (1978).
138. Id. at 347.
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wished, be disciplined by his own pencil into clean, hard prose.'"
Henry Kissinger was another intellectual whose perception of Eisenhower
changed radically over time. While teaching at Harvard, Kissinger had written
several works deploring "'the vacuum of leadership' " in the Eisenhower ad-
ministration, " 'a view I have since changed.' "140 Kissinger was reported to
have met with the dying Eisenhower shortly after the Nixon inauguration and
was visibly impressed with Ike's "vividly forceful personality and great politi-
cal sophistication and interest." ' Kissinger recalled that Eisenhower's "force-
fulness was surprising. His syntax which seemed so awkward in print, became
much more graphic when enlivened by his cold, deep blue, extraordinarily pen-
etrating eyes and when given emphasis by his still commanding voice."" 2 Kis-
singer was much taken by the former President's political awareness and sharp
mind.
Of all historians examining the period, it is Fred Greenstein of Princeton
who appears most impressed with Eisenhower's personality and intellect. In his
1982 book on Eisenhower entitled The Hidden Hand Presidency, Greenstein
calls Ike a man with a "keen analytic mind," that resulted in a "clear incisive-
ness" of expression. 43 Greenstein suggests that the famed Eisenhower press
conferences, cited by some as proof of the President's lack of brilliance be-
cause of their "intellectual thinness and syntactical flaws,"' 4 were purpose-
fully lackluster.1 4 5 Eisenhower's seemingly rambling and uninformed perform-
ances actually
resulted from caution. With press conferences open to quotation and broad-
cast, "an inadvertent misstatement in public would be a calamity." But...
realizing that "it is far better to stumble or speak guardedly than to move
ahead smoothly and risk imperilling the country," by consistently focusing
on ideas rather than on phrasing, he "was able to avoid causing the nation a
serious setback through anything [he] ...said in many hours, over eight
years of intensive questioning."116
There were many matters that the President thought best left undisclosed.
To prevent damaging disclosure, he either feigned ignorance of the matter or
replied in double talk to confuse the issue thoroughly.1 47 Thus, his press con-
ference performances, far from indicating Ike's ineptitude, were actually de-
monstrative of his political savvy. Greenstein also speaks of numerous private
memoranda, which Eisenhower had composed, as reflecting his intellect:
139. Id.
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They include dispassionate, closely reasoned assessments of contemporary
issues and personalities that belie the amiable, informal, and often vague
usages of his press conference discourse. Startlingly, for a man who seemed,
to as acute an observer as Richard Rovere, to have an "unschematic" mind,
many of his confidential writings display geometric precision in stating the
basic conditions shaping a problem, deducing their implications, and weigh-
ing the costs and benefits of alternative possible responses." 8
To Greenstein and others, then, Eisenhower possessed a first-rate intellect.
Not only do contemporary writers now suggest that Eisenhower was a man
of superior intellectual ability, he is no longer considered to have been a politi-
cal neophyte. Ike now has developed a reputation as an intense, tough, skilled
political operator and, indeed, as a manipulator. Herbert Parmet suggests that
Eisenhower had "a remarkable political instinct . . . he knew how to manipu-
late men, to use them for his purpose and then cut them loose."' 9 Greenstein
also paints the portrait of a shrewd, intense politician.
In contrast with a previous view of him as being somewhat lazy, Ike is now
seen as a man of tremendous "restless energy. 1 50 This energy made the nu-
merous meetings the President attended most disconcerting to the others pre-
sent. Dilion Anderson, his National Security Advisor,
was one of many . . . who described the way Eisenhower would get up and
pace the floor in an informal meeting as his enthusiasm mounted. "He was a
man of a lot of native animal energy, which came out when a subject stirred
him up, and he used to get up and walk the floor."'' 1
Greenstein states that although Eisenhower
subjected himself to the passive context of regular long meetings and more
tightly packed, longer work schedules than he chose to publicize, his physi-
cal comportment in meetings revealed his force and drive. His concentration
was intense: his excess energy spilled over as he would doodle, finger his
glasses, swivel in his chair, and look at other speakers with piercing bright
blue eyes that innumerable observers sensed as windows to an inner
dynamism."'
The Eisenhower workday began early in the morning and generally did not
end until late at night, and he often extended this schedule into the week-
end."" The length and fullness of his schedule, however, was never publicized,
in contrast to his highly touted periods of relaxation, which included much
golf.'" This probably led to his contemporary reputation for passivity and la-
ziness. The President, however, purposely concealed his hard work because
148. Id. at 20.
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"[plublicity . . . would have been discordant with the impression he conveyed
of being a president who so successfully maintained national and international
order that he did not have to work intensively around-the-clock"'l-a seem-
.ingly shrewd, politically inspired action. Indeed, "[t]he much publicized golf-
ing trips, the working vacations, and even the Wild West stories he read at
bedtime, which many critics suggested were the outward signs of a passive
president with a flaccid mind," were actually medically required "prescriptions
for winding down a man whose drive and intensity needed to be kept in
check."' 56 Even then, periods of "relaxation" were not all that relaxing:
Golfing companions describe the stubborn determination he would pour into
replaying an unsatisfactory shot. And what he liked about bridge was the
opportunity it gave him to focus sharply on the solution to a logical problem
and at the same time master the psychology of effective cooperation with his
partner and competition with his opponents. 157
If, then, the public image of President Eisenhower throughout his term in
office was that of an amiable "non-political chief of state"1 8 as opposed to a
partisan activist, historian Greenstein claims that Eisenhower's image was not
an adequate reflection of the realities of the Eisenhower presidency." Rather,
it was an image purposely cultivated by the President in order to render him-
self both politically effective and nationally popular. 6 Greenstein suggests
that the presidency of the United States is really a most unique office combin-
ing the usually separate roles of prime minister-a partisan position-and
chief of state-a nonpolitical position."6 In order to reconcile these seemingly
conflicting roles, and "balance the contradictory expectations that a president
be a national unifier yet nevertheless engage in the divisive exercise of political
leadership," 6 Eisenhower conducted a "hidden-hand Presidency,"' 68 whereby
to the public he appeared nonpartisan, above politics, "a proper chief of state,"
yet at the same time acting decisively behind the scenes to effectuate his parti-
san political objectives. 6' Acting in this manner enabled Eisenhower to be
successful, Greenstein claims, in both roles. He was able "to exercise power
without seeming to flex his muscles. 1 6 Indeed, "[o]n the assumption that a
president who is predominantly viewed in terms of his political prowess will
lose public support by not appearing to be a proper chief of state, Eisenhower
155. Id. at 42.
156. Id. at 39.
157. Id.
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went to great lengths to conceal the political side of his leadership."1 66
Greenstein describes a number of episodes demonstrating Eisenhower's en-
ergetic political leadership. For example, Eisenhower could be impressively en-
ergetic in pushing his legislative program through Congress. Both the centrist
domestic program and the internationalist foreign policy he pursued brought
much opposition from such conservative Republicans as Senators Robert Taft
of Ohio and William Knowland of California. 1 6 Ike therefore devoted a great
deal of time and effort in attempting to moderate their opposition and lessen
its impact.16 8 In fact, to ensure the success of his 1954 legislative program,
Eisenhower covertly acted to bring pressure to bear on Senate Democratic
Leader Lyndon Johnson to coerce his support, "using a wealthy Johnson sup-
porter.""6 9 In this connection, Eisenhower, through Secretary of-the Treasury
George Humphrey, apparently attempted to push Texas oil multimillionaire
and Johnson backer Sid Richardson to "'get [Johnson] . . . on the right chan-
nel, or threaten to get [Texas Governor Allen] Shivers in a primary and beat
him for Senate.' 170
Eisenhower's most telling example of political leadership was his covert ac-
tivity designed to bring about the downfall of Senator Joseph McCarthy.
While many liberals in the 1950s attacked Eisenhower for supposedly refusing
to take any action against McCarthy, Greenstein counters this criticism, de-
voting many pages 7 to describing the hitherto undisclosed direct and indirect
efforts Eisenhower made to "eliminat[e] McCarthy's influence":1 7 2
Though Eisenhower was far from being the only (or even the decisive) agent
of McCarthy's political demise, upon taking office he quickly recognized the
importance of defusing the senator. He formulated and even summarized in
his private diary a basic strategy for accomplishing this, a strategy he con-
tinued to use, but adjusted and supplemented during the periods of McCar-
thy's seemingly unchallenged sovereignty in 1953 and his precipitous decline
in 1954.173
Greenstein claims that, contrary to earlier belief, Eisenhower was quite active
in the drive to destroy McCarthy, although he acted in both subtle and undis-
closed ways.1 7 Throughout 1953 and 1954, there was apparently a flurry of
secret White House strategy sessions to devise various ways to undermine Mc-
Carthy's power within the Republican party and derail his quest for popular
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168. Id. at 68-72.
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acceptance. 17 A behind-the-scenes strategy of manipulation was developed.' 76
Cryptic public remarks were made by the President, which though not refer-
ring to McCarthy by name, were designed to steadily erode the Senator's re-
spectability through praise of those men and institutions he had attacked.177
Political leaders who opposed McCarthy were encouraged.' 7 8 Finally, Eisen-
hower directed a private "hidden-hand" campaign with Republican congres-
sional leaders to eradicate McCarthy's influence within the Senate itself.17 9
Greenstein also confirms that Dwight Eisenhower was not nearly as con-
servative as liberals in the 1950s believed him to be. In this context, much was
made at the time of his hobnobbing with rich businessmen such as Cliff Rob-
erts at the posh Augusta National Golf Club or other sporting retreats. Much
was also made of his cabinet of, in the New Republic's phrase, "eight million-
aires and one plumber," his Secretary of Labor, Martin Durkin.'80 In fact, Ike
was moderate to liberal in most areas, with the significant exception, in many
views, of school desegregation. 181
It was his abiding belief in internationalism, and the fear that right-wing
Republicans such as Robert Taft would, if in power, act to return the nation
to isolationism, that avowedly caused Eisenhower to become the Republican
candidate for President in 1952.182 He also felt that domestically the Republi-
can party must move more leftward, toward the center, in order to survive.
While preparing the 1953 budget, he felt that "it was vital to include mea-
sures in the administration program that would proclaim 'broad and liberal
objectives in certain fields'" such as "'(a) slum clearance and public housing,
(b) utilization of America's water resources, (c) extension of social security
and old age benefits.' "183
[Eisenhower] sought to keep the public from perceiving the Republicans as
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the party of big business while at the same time thwarting passage of "radi-
cal" Democratic programs by initiating moderate Republican alternatives
... .Eisenhower hoped that by enunciating "broad and liberal objectives,"
advancing moderate improvements in social programs, and establishing a
reputation ...for fostering a thriving economy, he could ...reconstitute
the electoral base of his party . . depriv[ing] the Democrats of their corner
on "the common man."' 84
CONCLUSION
In sum, our earlier images of Stevenson and Eisenhower now seem some-
what reversed. It now appears that it was Eisenhower who was energetic, deci-
sive, cerebral, involved, focused, disciplined, in control, democratic, and, on
balance, liberal, while Stevenson tended to be vague, superficial, unintellec-
tual, removed, self-indulgent, drifting, snobbish, and rather conservative. Per-
haps in time our views will change again, given the complexity of each man,
but the dramatically shifting views of both men should at least give us some
pause about contemporaneous judgments of political leaders, shouldn't it?18
184. Id. at 50-52.
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